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Abstract
We study stable matching problems in networks where players are embedded in a social
context, and may incorporate friendship relations or altruism into their decisions. Each player
is a node in a social network and strives to form a good match with a neighboring player. We
consider the existence, computation, and inefficiency of stable matchings from which no pair of
players wants to deviate. When the benefits from a match are the same for both players, we
show that incorporating the well-being of other players into their matching decisions significantly
decreases the price of stability, while the price of anarchy remains unaffected. Furthermore, a
good stable matching achieving the price of stability bound always exists and can be reached
in polynomial time. We extend these results to more general matching rewards, when players
matched to each other may receive different utilities from the match. For this more general case,
we show that incorporating social context (i.e., “caring about your friends”) can make an even
larger difference, and greatly reduce the price of anarchy. We show a variety of existence results,
and present upper and lower bounds on the prices of anarchy and stability for various matching
utility structures. Finally, we extend most of our results to network contribution games, in
which players can decide how much effort to contribute to each incident edge, instead of simply
choosing a single node to match with.
1 Introduction
Stable matching problems form the basis of many important assignment and allocation tasks in
economics and computer science. The central approach to analyzing such scenarios is two-sided
matching, which has been studied intensively since the 1970s in both the algorithms and economics
literature [19, 34]. An important variant of stable matching is matching with cardinal utilities,
when each match can be given numerical values expressing the quality or reward that the match
yields for each of the incident players [3]. Cardinal utilities specify the quality of each match
instead of just a preference ordering, and they allow the comparison of different matchings using
measures such as social welfare. A particularly appealing special case of cardinal utilities is known as
correlated stable matching, where both players who are matched together obtain the same reward.
Apart from the wide-spread applications of correlated stable matching in, e.g., market sharing [18],
job markets [6], social networks [20], and distributed computer networks [18, 31], this model also
has favorable theoretical properties such as the existence of a potential function. It guarantees
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existence of a stable matching even in the non-bipartite case, where every pair of players is allowed
to match [1, 31].
When matching individuals in a social environment, it is often unreasonable to assume that
each player cares only about their own match quality. Instead, players may incorporate the well-
being of their friends/neighbors as well, or that of friends-of-friends. Players may even be altruistic
to some degree, and consider the welfare of all players in the network. Caring about friends
and altruistic behavior is commonly observed in practice and has been documented in laboratory
experiments [15,30]. However, results in algorithmic game theory about the impact of social context
on stable outcomes are only recently starting to appear [7, 11–13, 21–23]. In this paper, we study
how social context influences stability and efficiency in matching scenarios. We use a general
approach incorporating the social context of a player into its decisions. Every player may consider
the well-being of every other player to some degree, with the degree of this regardfulness possibly
decaying with the hop distance in the network. Players who only care about their neighbors, as
well as fully altruistic players, are special cases of this model. Our model of altruism is a strict
generalization of recent approaches in algorithmic game theory in which the social welfare of the
whole population is (part of) the utility of each player.
Moreover, for matching in social environments, the standard model of correlated stable matching
may be too constraining compared to general cardinal utilities, because matched players receive
exactly the same reward. Such an equal sharing property is intuitive and bears a simple beauty, but
there are a variety of other reward sharing methods that can be more natural in different contexts.
For instance, in theoretical computer science it is common practice to list authors alphabetically,
but in other disciplines the author sequence is carefully designed to ensure a proper allocation
of credit to the different participants of a joint paper. Here the credit is often supposed to be
allocated in terms of input, i.e., the first author should be the one that has contributed most to the
project. Such input-based or proportional sharing is then sometimes overruled with sharing based
on intrinsic or acquired social status, e.g., when a distinguished expert in a field is easily recognized
and subconsciously credited most with authorship of an article. In this paper, we are interested in
how such unequal reward sharing rules affect stable matching scenarios. In particular, we consider a
large class of local reward sharing rules and characterize the impact of unequal sharing on existence
and inefficiency of stable matchings, both in cases when players are embedded in a social context
and when they are not.
Recently, correlated matching problems have become the basis for analyzing more general con-
tribution and participation games in networks. In such games, each player must decide how much
effort to contribute to each relationship or project that it is involved in. Insights on such problems
may advance the understanding of contribution incentives in networked societies and improve the
design of user-based platforms. As we show in Sections 5 and 6, we are able to extend most of
our results about stable matching in the presence of social context and general reward sharing to
network contribution games which have recently been introduced in [5].
1.1 Stable Matching and Contribution Games
In this paper we consider two classes of games: stable matching with cardinal utilities, and convex
contribution games. We consider both scenarios in the presence of social context, and unequal
reward sharing.
Stable Matching Correlated stable matching is a prominent subclass of general ordinary stable
matching. In this game, we are given a (non-bipartite) graph G = (V,E) with edge weights re. In
a matching M , if node u is matched to node v, the utility of node u is defined to be exactly re.
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This can be interpreted as both u and v getting an identical reward from being matched together.
We will also consider unequal reward sharing, where node u obtains some reward rue and node
v obtains reward rve with r
u
e + r
v
e = re. Therefore, the preference ordering of each node over its
possible matches is implied by the rewards that this node obtains from different edges. A pair of
nodes (u, v) is called a blocking pair in matching M if u and v are not matched to each other in M ,
but can both strictly increase their rewards by being matched to each other instead. A matching
with no blocking pairs is called a stable matching.
While the matching model above has been well-studied, in this paper we are interested in stable
matchings that arise in the presence of social context. Denote the reward obtained by a node v in
a matching M as Rv. We now consider the case when node u not only cares about its own reward,
but also about the rewards of its friends. Specifically, the perceived or friendship utility of node v
in matching M is defined as
Uv = Rv +
diam(G)∑
d=1
αd
∑
u∈Nd(v)
Ru,
where Nd(v) is the set of nodes with shortest distance exactly d from v, and 1 ≥ α1 ≥ α2 ≥ . . . ≥ 0
(we use ~α to denote the vector of αi values). In other words, for a node u that is distance d away
from v, the utility of v increases by an αd factor of the reward received by u. Thus, if αd = 0 for all
d ≥ 2, this means that nodes only care about their neighbors, while if all αd > 0, this means that
nodes are altruistic and care about the rewards of everyone in the graph. The perceived utility
is the quantity that the nodes are trying to maximize, and thus, in the presence of friendship, a
blocking pair would be a pair of nodes such that each could increase its perceived utility by matching
to each other.
Contribution Games While most of the results in this paper concern stable matching, we also
study convex contribution games (CCG) (for detailed definition and discussion see [5]). In these
games, we are given a graph G = (V,E) with a reward function fe : R≥0 × R≥0 → R≥0 for each
edge e, which is assumed to be nondecreasing and convex in each of its arguments, and obeys the
property that fe(0, y) = fe(x, 0) = 0 for all x, y. The nodes are players of this game: each node v
has a budget Bv, and its strategy consists of deciding how to allocate this budget among its incident
edges. The reward to node v from edge e = (v, u) is equal to fe(sv(e), su(e)), where sv(e) and su(e)
are the amounts of budget allocated to edge e by nodes v and u respectively. For the case where
reward to endpoints of an edge is allowed to be different, we instead have two functions: f ve and
fue such that v receives f
v
e (sv(e), su(e)) reward and u receives f
u
e (sv(e), su(e)) reward. The total
reward of a node v (which we denote by Rv) is simply the total reward it collects from incident
edges.
In this paper, just as in [5], we will mostly be concerned with pairwise equilibria of CCG. A
pairwise equilibrium (a.k.a. a 2-strong equilibrium) is a solution where no pair of players can switch
their strategies (budget allocations) simultaneously such that both players strictly increase their
rewards. Also, a pairwise equilibrium must not possess any unilateral improving deviations by any
individual player.
Just as with stable matching, we are interested in the properties of CCG with social context
and friendship utilites. This version is defined analogously: the perceived utility of a node v is
Uv = Rv+
∑diam(G)
d=1 αd
∑
u∈Nd(v)
Ru, and this is what node v is attempting to maximize. Therefore,
a pairwise equilibrium in the presence of friendship means that there is no pair of nodes that can
simultaneously improve their perceived utility.
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Centralized Optimum and the Price of Anarchy We study the social welfare of equilibrium
solutions and compare them to an optimal centralized solution. The social welfare is the sum of
rewards, i.e., the optimal solution is the one that maximizes
∑
v Rv. Notice that, while this is
equivalent to maximizing the sum of player utilities when ~α = 0, this is no longer true with social
context (i.e., when ~α 6= 0). Nevertheless, as in e.g. [12, 32], we believe this is a well-motivated
and important measure of solution quality, as it captures the overall performance of the system,
while ignoring the perceived “good-will” effects of friendship and altruism. For example, when
considering projects done in pairs, the reward of an edge can represent actual productivity, while
the perceived utility may not.
To compare stable solutions with the centralized optimum, we will often consider the price of
anarchy and the price of stability. When considering stable matchings, by the price of anarchy
(resp. stability) we will mean the ratio between the optimum centralized solution and the worst
(resp. best) stable matching. Similarly, when considering CCG, by the price of anarchy (resp.
stability) we will mean the ratio between the optimum centralized solution and the worst (resp.
best) pairwise equilibrium.
1.2 Our Results
For stable matching with cardinal utilities we show the following.
• For friendship utilities and equal reward sharing, a stable matching exists and the price of
anarchy (ratio of the maximum-weight matching with the worst stable matching) is at most
2, the same as in the case without friendship. The price of stability, on the other hand,
improves in the presence of friendship, as we can show a tight bound of 2+2α11+2α1+α2 . Moreover,
we present a dynamic process that converges to a stable matching of at least this quality in
polynomial time, if initiated from the maximum-weight matching.
• When two nodes matched together may receive different rewards, a stable matching may
not exist. However, for several natural local reward sharing rules (e.g., when reward shares
depend on inherent properties of the two incident nodes, see Section 3), we show that a stable
matching exists. Moreover, for arbitrary oblivious reward sharing (i.e., when rewards for the
incident players are arbitrary but independent of the matching decisions of other players),
we show that prices of anarchy and stability depend on the level of inequality among reward
shares. Specifically, if R is the maximum ratio over all edges (u, v) ∈ E of the reward shares
of node u and v, then the price of anarchy is at most 1 +R without friendship, and at most
(1+R)(1+α1)
1+α1R
with friendship utilities. We also show tight or almost-tight lower bounds on the
price of anarchy, and give improved results for several particular reward sharing rules.
Our results imply that for socially aware players, the price of stability can greatly improve:
e.g., if α1 = α2 =
1
2 , then the price of stability is at most
6
5 , and a solution of this quality can
be obtained efficiently. Moreover, if reward sharing is extremely unfair (R is unbounded), then
friendship becomes even more important: changing α1 from 0 to
1
2 reduces the price of anarchy
from being unbounded to being at most 3.
We next consider convex contribution games. While friendship changes the properties of these
games (e.g., there might be instances without a strong equilibrium), we show that all of the results
mentioned above for stable matching also hold for convex contribution games, replacing “stable
matching” with “pairwise equilibrium”. For the case where players do not have to spend all of
their budget, this is not difficult to show, as there is a one-to-one correspondence between stable
matchings and pairwise equilibria. For the case where players must spend their entire budget,
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however, this becomes somewhat trickier, as the types of deviations available to players in convex
contribution games are significantly more numerous than in stable matching models. Nevertheless,
we show that the same results hold for the case of local friendship, i.e., where αi = 0 for all i ≥ 2.
We also show new results for specific reward sharing rules in convex contribution games, such as
proportional sharing, where a node’s share of reward from an edge is proportional to the amount
of effort it contributes to the edge.
1.3 Related Work
Stable matching problems have been studied intensively over the last few decades. On the algorith-
mic side, existence, efficient algorithms, and improvement dynamics for two-sided stable matchings
have been of interest (for references, see standard textbooks [19, 34]). In this paper we address
the more general stable roommates problem, in which every player can be matched to every other
player. For general preference lists, there have been numerous works characterizing and algorith-
mically deciding existence of stable matchings [14,24,35,37]. For the correlated stable roommates
problem, existence is guaranteed by a potential function argument [1,31], and convergence time of
random improvement dynamics is polynomial [2]. In [4], price of anarchy and stability bounds for
approximate correlated stable matchings were provided. In contrast, we study friendship, altruism,
and unequal reward sharing in stable roommate problems with cardinal utilities.
Another line of research closely connected to some of our results involves game-theoretic models
for contribution. A prominent example is the general approach by Ballester et al [9], in which
equilibria exhibit similarities with a commonly known centrality index in social networks. There
are numerous extensions and variants of this game. In all these games, however, players contribute
quite generally to the whole society, and not to particular links or relationships. See [17] for an
analysis of a broad framework that includes this game and several others (such as public goods
games [10]). Instead, in [5] we consider a contribution game tied more closely to matching problems.
Here players have a budget of effort and contribute parts of this effort towards specific projects and
relationships. For more related work on the contribution game, see [5]. All previous results for this
model concern equal sharing and do not address the impact of the player’s social context.
Analytical aspects of reward sharing have been a central theme in game theory since its begin-
ning, especially in cooperative games [33]. Recently, there have been prominent algorithmic results
also for network bargaining [26, 27] and credit allocation problems [28]. In addition, the work
in [8] considers various reward sharing schemes in coalition formation; their motivation resembles
ours, although they mostly consider Nash equilibrium solutions in hypergraphs, while we consider
pairwise equilibria in the presence of social context. Work such as [38] could also be considered a
generalization of contribution games, but in the cooperative setting and without the players having
a social context.
Our notion of a player’s social context is based on numerical influence parameters that determine
the impact of player rewards on the (perceived) utilities of other players. A recently popular
model of altruism is inspired by Ledyard [29] and has generated much interest in algorithmic game
theory [12,13,22,23]. Our model smoothly interpolates between this global approach and the idea
of surplus collaboration among players in a given social context put forward in [7,32] and considered
recently in [11].
In addition, our work is more generally related to the area of strategic network creation games,
in which selfish players build networks and optimize different trade-offs between creation cost and
benefits from network structure. For an introduction to this literature see recent expositions [25,36].
In this literature, there also originated a notion of pairwise equilibrium, which allows fewer player
deviations than what we term pairwise equilibrium here. In our case, it corresponds exactly to
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u v
 (both u and v were
  matched before)
w
z
Figure 1: biswivel deviation
u v
w
 (v was unmatched
  before the deviation)
u v
  before the deviation)
 (both u and v were unmatched
Figure 2: swivel deviation
2-strong equilibrium; for a discussion see [5].
2 Stable Matching with Friendship Utilities
We begin by considering correlated stable matching in the presence of friendship utilities. In this
section, the reward received by both nodes of an edge in a matching is the same, i.e., we use equal
reward sharing, where every edge e has an inherent value re and both endpoints receive this value
if edge e is in the matching. We consider more general reward sharing schemes in Sections 3 and 4.
Recall that the friendship utility of a node v increase by αdRu for every node u, where d is the
shortest distance between v and u. We abuse notation slightly, and let αuv denote αd, so if u and
v are neighbors, then αuv = α1.
Given a matching M , we begin by classifying the following types of improving deviations that
a blocking pair can undergo.
Definition 1. We call an improving deviation a biswivel whenever two neighbors u and v switch to
match to each other, such that both u and v were matched to some other nodes before the deviation
in M .
See Figure 1 for explanation. For such a biswivel to exist in a matching, the following necessary
and sufficient conditions must hold.
(1 + α1)ruv > (1 + α1)ruw + (α1 + αuz) rvz (1)
(1 + α1)ruv > (1 + α1)rvz + (α1 + αvw) ruw (2)
Inequality (1) can be explained as follows: The left side quantifies the utility gained by u because of
getting matched to v and the right side quantifies the utility lost by u because of u and v breaking
their present matchings with w and z respectively. Hence Inequality (1) implies that u gains more
utility by getting matched with v than it loses because of u and v breaking their matchings with v
and z. Inequality (2) can similarly be explained in the context of node v.
Definition 2. We call an improving deviation a swivel whenever two neighbors get matched such
that at least one node among the two neighbors was not matched before the deviation.
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See Figure 2 for explanation. For such a swivel to occur, the following set of conditions must
hold.
(1 + α1)ruv > (1 + α1)ruw (3)
(1 + α1)ruv > (α1 + αvw)ruw (4)
Inequality (3) says that u gains more utility by getting matched with v than it loses by breaking
its matching with w. Inequality (4) says that v gains more utility by getting matched with v than
the utility it loses because of u breaking its matching with w. As α1+αvw ≤ 1+α1, Inequality (4)
is implied by Inequality (3). This means that if v is unmatched, the only condition for (u, v) to
be a blocking pair is that u should have net increase in utility by getting matched with v. This
is true even if v and w are neighbors. Canceling the factor of 1 + α1, we can thus summarize this
(necessary and sufficient) condition for swivel to be an improving deviation as:
ruv > ruw (5)
All improving deviations by a blocking pair can be classified as either a biswivel or a swivel,
depending only on whether both nodes are matched or not. Now we make the following observation
which will be useful later:
Lemma 1. Suppose a node u is matched to w in matching M . If (u, v) form a blocking pair, then
ruv > ruw.
Proof. It is straightforward to see it from inequalities (1) and (2) for a biswivel and inequality (5)
in case of a swivel.
2.1 Existence and Price of Anarchy of Stable Matching with Friendship Utilities
Theorem 1. A stable matching exists in stable matching games with friendship utilities. Moreover,
the set of stable matchings without friendship (i.e., when ~α = 0) is a subset of the set of stable
matchings with friendship utilities on the same graph.
Proof. For ~α = 0, our model is a subcase of correlated stable matching, so a stable matching M
exists. All we need to prove now is that the same M is stable when we have friendship utilities.
Suppose it is not the case, i.e., M is unstable for some value of ~α. This is possible only if we
have a blocking pair (u, v). But this cannot happen because:
• If both u and v were unmatched in M then M could not have been stable for ~α = 0.
• If exactly one of u and v is unmatched in M , say u is matched to w and v is unmatched, then
for (u, v) to be a blocking pair, ruv > ruw by Lemma 1. But in such a case, M could not have
been stable for ~α = 0.
• Suppose both u and v are matched in M , say u is matched to w and v is matched to z. In
such a case if (u, v) forms a blocking pair corresponding to a biswivel, then by Lemma 1, we
have ruv > ruw and ruv > rvz and thus M could not have been stable for ~α = 0.
Hence we have shown that no blocking pair exists in M with friendship utilities, thus proving the
theorem.
Theorem 2. The price of anarchy in stable matching games with friendship utilities is at most 2,
and this bound is tight.
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Proof. This theorem is simply a special case of our much more general Theorem 10, which proves
a price of anarchy bound of 1 + R+α11+α1R , with R being a measure of how unequally players can
share rewards on an edge. When players share edge rewards equally, the price of anarchy bound in
Theorem 10 reduces to 1+ 1+α11+α1 = 2, as desired. To show that this bound is tight, simply consider
a 3-edge path with all edge rewards being 1, for any value of ~α.
2.2 Price of Stability and Convergence
The main result in this section bounds the price of stability in stable matching games with friend-
ship utilities to 2+2α11+2α1+α2 , and this bound is tight (see Theorem 4 below). This bound has some
interesting implications. It is decreasing in each α1 and α2, hence having friendship utilities al-
ways yields a lower price of stability than without friendship utilities. Also, note that values of
α3, α4, ..., αdiam(G) have no influence. Thus, caring about players more than distance 2 away does
not improve the price of stability in any way. Also, if α1 = α2 = 1, then PoS = 1, i.e., there
will exist a stable matching which will also be a social optimum. Thus loving thy neighbor and
thy neighbor’s neighbor but nobody beyond is sufficient to guarantee that there exists at least one
socially optimal stable matching. In fact, due to the shape of the curve, even small values of friend-
ship quickly decrease the price of stability; e.g., setting α1 = α2 = 0.1 already decreases the price
of stability from 2 to ∼ 1.7.
We will establish the price of stability bound by defining an algorithm that creates a good
stable matching in polynomial time. One possible idea to create a stable matching that is close to
optimum is to use a Best-Blocking-Pair algorithm: start with the best possible matching, i.e. a
social optimum, which may or may not be stable. Now choose the “best” blocking pair (u, v): the
one with maximum edge reward ruv. Allow this blocking pair to get matched to each other instead
of their current partners. Check if the resulting matching is stable. If it is not stable then allow
the best blocking pair for this matching to get matched. Repeat the procedure until there are no
more blocking pairs, thereby obtaining a stable matching.
This algorithm gives the desired price of stability and running time bounds for the case of “al-
truism” when all αi are the same, see Corollary 1 below. To provide the desired bound with general
friendship utilities, we must alter this algorithm slightly using the concept of relaxed blocking pair.
Definition 3. Given a matching M , we call a pair of nodes (u, v) a relaxed blocking pair if either
(u, v) form an improving swivel, or u and v are matched to w and z respectively, with the following
inequalities being true:
(1 + α1)ruv > (1 + α1)ruw + (α1 + α2) rvz (6)
(1 + α1)ruv > (1 + α1)rvz + (α1 + α2) ruw (7)
In other words, a relaxed blocking pair ignores the possible edges between nodes u and z, and
has α2 in the place of αuz (similarly, α2 in the place of αvw). It is clear from this definition that a
blocking pair is also a relaxed blocking pair, since the conditions above are less constraining than
Inequalities (1) and (2). Thus a matching with no relaxed blocking pairs is also a stable matching.
Moreover, it is easy to see that Lemma 1 still holds for relaxed blocking pairs. We will call a
relaxed blocking pair satisfying Inequalities (6) and (7) a relaxed biswivel, which may or may not
correspond to an improving deviation, since a relaxed blocking pair is not necessarily a blocking
pair.
Now we present the algorithm to compute a stable matching that is close to optimal.
8
2.2.1 Best-Relaxed-Blocking-Pair Algorithm
1. Initialize M =M∗ where M∗ is a socially optimum matching.
2. If there is no relaxed blocking pair, terminate. Otherwise make the relaxed blocking pair
(u, v) with maximum edge reward ruv be matched to each other. In other words, remove the
edges of M containing u and v, and add the edge (u, v) to M .
3. Repeat step 2.
2.2.2 Dynamics of Best-Relaxed-Blocking-Pair
To establish the efficient running time of Best-Relaxed-Blocking-Pair and the price of stability
bound of the resulting stable matching, we first analyze the dynamics of this algorithm and prove
some helpful lemmas. We can interpret the algorithm as a sequence of swivel and relaxed biswivel
deviations, each inserting one edge into M , and removing up to two edges. Note that it is not
guaranteed that the inserted edge will stay forever in M , as a subsequent deviation can remove
this edge from M . Let O1, O2, O3, · · · denote this sequence of deviations, and e(i) denote the edge
which got inserted into M because of Oi. Now let us analyze the dynamics of the algorithm by
using the following two lemmas.
Lemma 2. The first deviation O1 during the execution of Best-Relaxed-Blocking-Pair is a
relaxed biswivel.
Proof. Having O1 as a swivel will strictly improve the value of matching by Lemma 1. Hence if
we begin the algorithm with M = M∗, having O1 as a swivel will produce a matching with value
strictly greater than M∗, which is a contradiction.
Lemma 3. Let Oj be a relaxed biswivel that takes place during the execution of the best relaxed
blocking pair algorithm. Suppose a deviation Ok takes place before Oj . Then we have re(k) ≥ re(j).
Furthermore, if Ok is a relaxed biswivel then e(k) 6= e(j) (thus at most |E(G)| relaxed biswivels can
take place during the execution of the algorithm).
It is important to note that this lemma does not say that re(i) ≥ re(j) for i < j. We are only
guaranteed that re(i) ≥ re(j) for i < j if Oj is a relaxed biswivel. Between two successive relaxed
biswivels Ok and Oj , the sequence of re(i) for consecutive swivels can and does increase as well as
decrease, and the same edge may be added to the matching multiple times. All that is guaranteed
is that re(j) for a biswivel Oj will have a lower value than all the preceding re(i)’s. Thus, this lemma
suggests a nice representation of Best-Relaxed-Blocking-Pair in terms of phases, where we
define a phase as a subsequence of deviations that begins with a relaxed biswivel and continues
until the next relaxed biswivel. Lemma 3 guarantees that at the start of each phase, the re(j) value
is smaller than the values in all previous phases, and that there is only a polynomial number of
phases. Now we proceed to prove Lemma 3.
Proof. Let e(j) = (vz) get inserted in M because of a relaxed biswivel Oj . We first give a brief
outline of the proof. Suppose that the claim re(k) ≥ re(j) for k < j is false and we have an Ok with
k < j such that re(k) < re(j). Clearly (v, z) could not have been a relaxed blocking pair just before
Ok, otherwise the algorithm would have chosen (v, z) as the best relaxed blocking pair instead of
Ok. We will show that this leads to a conclusion that (v, z) cannot be a relaxed blocking pair even
for Oj . This is a contradiction, hence our assumption of re(k) < re(j) could not have been correct.
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Thus for all Ok such that k < j we will have re(k) ≥ re(j). Later we will use similar reasoning to
prove that if Oi with i < j is a relaxed biswivel that takes place before a relaxed biswivel Oj then
e(i) 6= e(j). Now let us proceed to the proof.
Suppose to the contrary that we have Ok with k < j such that re(k) < re(j) with Oj being a
relaxed biswivel. As discussed in the outline of the proof, this implies that (v, z) was not a relaxed
blocking pair at the time Ok was selected. Let S be the set of nodes with whom v and z are matched
at the time that Ok is selected. As long as S does not change, v and z will not be a relaxed blocking
pair, since the change in utility experienced by v and z from matching to each other depends only
on their partners in the current matching, i.e., the set S. Thus for the relaxed biswivel Oj to occur,
S must change between Ok and Oj . We will show that this leads to a contradiction: that (v, z)
cannot be a relaxed blocking pair for the time Oj is selected.
Suppose v is matched to x and z is matched to y just before biswivel Oj . Since (v, z) is a relaxed
blocking pair at this point, we thus have
(1 + α1)rvz > (1 + α1)rvx + (α1 + α2)rzy (8)
(1 + α1)rvz > (1 + α1)rzy + (α1 + α2)rvx. (9)
Recall that (v, z) was not a relaxed blocking pair just before Ok, and to make it a relaxed blocking
pair for Oj , S must change between Ok and Oj . Let Ol be the last deviation which changed S to
{x, z}. Without loss of generality, we can assume that Ol adds the edge (v, x). Now we have two
cases:
• (v, z) was a relaxed blocking pair at the time Ol is selected: in this case (v, x) could not have
been the best relaxed blocking pair for Ol because inequality (8) tells us rvz > rvx.
• (v, z) was not a relaxed blocking pair at the time Ol is selected: Suppose v was matched with
w before Ol. As (v, z) was not a relaxed blocking pair just before Ol we have
Either (1 + α1)rvz ≤ (1 + α1)rvw + (α1 + α2)rzy (10)
OR (1 + α1)rvz ≤ (1 + α1)rzy + (α1 + α2)rvw (11)
(If v was not matched just before Ol then substitute rvw = 0 to obtain appropriate condition.)
Assume that it is inequality (10) that holds. Then, because Ol removes edge (v,w) and adds
edge (v, x), we have rvx > rvw as Lemma 1 holds for relaxed blocking pairs. Thus, the
following must be true:
(1 + α1)rvz ≤ (1 + α1)rvx + (α1 + α2)rzy (12)
This contradicts inequality (8), and thus (v, z) cannot be a relaxed blocking pair at the time
Oj is selected. The same conclusion can be reached if we assume inequality (11) holds true.
Either way we arrive at a contradiction, thus showing that if Oj is a relaxed biswivel then for all
Ok with k < j, we have re(k) < re(j).
Now the only remaining piece is to prove e(k) 6= e(j) if Ok is a relaxed biswivel. All we need
to notice that if e(k) = e(j) = (v, z) then S has to change between Ok and Oj . Now we use
exactly the reasoning from the previous paragraph to arrive at a contradiction, thus proving that
e(k) 6= e(j).
10
2.2.3 Convergence of Best-Relaxed-Blocking-Pair
For the case where α1 = α2, the conditions for a blocking pair are identical to the conditions
for a relaxed blocking pair. Hence, our algorithm corresponds to letting the best blocking pair
deviate at each step. As a special case, for ~α = 0 and correlated stable matching, this algorithm
is known to provide a stable matching in polynomial time [2]. For friendship utilities, however,
(quick) convergence was previously unknown. Here we will show that even with the addition of
friendship, Best-Relaxed-Blocking-Pair (and thus Best-Blocking-Pair for the case when
α1 = α2) terminates and produces a stable matching. Moreover, it does this in polynomial time.
Note that if instead of the best we pick some arbitrary blocking pair, then there exists an
instance in which, starting from the empty matching, a sequence of blocking pairs of length 2Ω(n)
exists until reaching a stable matching, even without friendship. This is directly implied by recent
results in correlated stable matching [20].
A trivial adjustment of the gadget in [20] allows us to construct the exponential sequence even
when starting from the social optimum. We scale the reward of each (original) edge i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
in the gadget from i to 1+ i · ǫ, for some tiny ǫ > 0. This preserves all incentives and the structure
of all blocking pairs. Then, we add an auxiliary neighbor for each (original) player and connect it
via an auxiliary edge of reward 1. The social optimum is obviously given by matching each original
player with his auxiliary neighbor. However, the exponential sequence of blocking pairs still exists,
as auxiliary edges are not rewarding enough to influence blocking pairs among original players. Due
to the fact that such exponential-length sequences exist, it is perhaps surprising that our algorithm
indeed finds a stable matching and it terminates in polynomial time.
Theorem 3. Best-Relaxed-Blocking-Pair outputs a stable matching after O(m2) iterations,
where m is the number of edges in the graph.
Proof. Consider the three possible changes that can occur to the matchingM during each iteration:
a swivel could add a new edge, or it could delete an edge and add an edge with strictly higher re
value. A relaxed biswivel deletes two edges, and adds an edge with higher re value than either.
Thus, without any biswivels taking place, the total number of consecutive swivels is at most m2,
since no edges are deleted by swivels. Each relaxed biswivel can allow at most m extra swivels to
occur, since it deletes one edge. As there are at most m relaxed biswivel deviations possible by
Lemma 3, the algorithm terminates after at most m2 + m2 deviations. Since there are no more
relaxed blocking pairs for the algorithm to continue, and since a blocking pair is also a relaxed
blocking pair, then the final matching produced by the algorithm is a stable matching.
As we can have only a polynomial number of consecutive swivel deviations between each relaxed
biswivel, we know that every phase (defined as a maximal subsequence of consecutive swivels) lasts
only a polynomial amount of time, and there are only O(m) phases by Lemma 3. Moreover, in
each phase, the value of the matching only increases, since swivels only remove an edge if they add
a better one. Below, we use the fact that only relaxed biswivel operations reduce the cost of the
matching to bound the cost of the stable matching this algorithm produces.
2.2.4 Upper Bound on Price of Stability
Before proceeding to prove the bound, we will introduce some notation and prove some useful
lemmas.
We define a sequence of mappings from M∗ to E(G). Define h0 : M
∗ → E(G) as h0(e) = e.
Depending on Oi, we will define hi as follows: Suppose Oi is a deviation that removes edge hi−1(ej)
from M . If Oi inserts edge el in M then set hi(ej) = el. For all other ek ∈ M
∗, keep hi(ek) same
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as hi−1(ek). Let us note that a deviation Oi may not remove any edges from {hi−1(ej) : ej ∈M
∗}.
This can happen because during the course of the algorithm, two unmatched nodes can get matched,
say to insert ep into M . No edges in M
∗ get mapped to ep. If this edge is removed from M by
a later deviation, the mapping may not change, since no edge is mapped to ep. To summarize,
hi may be the same as hi−1, or may differ from hi−1 in one location (in case of a swivel), or in
two locations (in case of a relaxed biswivel). Denote the resulting mapping when our algorithm
terminates by hM .
Coupling Lemma 1 with the definition of mappings hi, we immediately have the following result:
Lemma 4. {rhi(e)}i≥0 is a nondecreasing sequence and rhi+1(e) > rhi(e) whenever hi+1(e) 6= hi(e).
The following lemma will be instrumental in proving the price of stability bound.
Lemma 5. If hM (ei) = hM (ej) with ei 6= ej then
1. There must exist a relaxed biswivel Ok such that hk−1(ei) 6= hk−1(ej) but Ok makes hk(ei) =
hk(ej). Furthermore, for all p ≥ k we have hp(ei) = hp(ej).
2. There does not exist another el ∈M
∗ such that hM (el) = hM (ei) = hM (ej).
3. rei + rej <
2+2α1
1+2α1+α2
× rhM (ei)
Proof. To prove the first part, say Ol was the first deviation such that hl−1(ei) 6= hl−1(ej) and
hl(ei) = hl(ej). It cannot happen because of a swivel deviation because a swivel can make hl(e) 6=
hl−1(e) for at most for one e ∈ M
∗. Thus Ol must be a relaxed biswivel. Set k = l and it is easy
to see that for p ≥ k we have hp(ei) = hp(ej). Hence the first part is proven.
To prove the second part, suppose there exists an el with el 6= ei 6= ej such that hM (el) =
hM (ei) = hM (ej). From the first part, there must exist a relaxed biswivel Ok s.t. hk−1(ei) 6=
hk−1(el) but hk(ei) = hk(el). Similarly there must exist a relaxed biswivel Op s.t. hp−1(ei) 6=
hp−1(ej) but hp(ei) = hp(ej). Without loss of generality say p > k. Using Lemma 3 we get
re(k) ≥ re(p). But from Lemma 4, we have re(k) < re(p), since e(p) = hp(ei) > hk(ei) = e(k).
Hence we have a contradiction here, thus proving that there does not exist another el ∈M
∗, with
hM (el) = hM (ei) = hM (ej).
To prove the third part, consider a relaxed biswivel Ok such that hk−1(ei) 6= hk−1(ej) and
hk(ei) = hk(ej). Substitute ruv = rhk(ei), ruw = rhk−1(ei) and rvz = rhk−1(ej) in inequalities (1)
and (2). Adding these inequalities and simplifying, we get
rhk−1(ei) + rhk−1(ej) <
2 + 2α1
1 + 2α1 + α2
× rhk(ei) (13)
From Lemma 4, we have that {rhi(e)}i≥0 as a nondecreasing sequence. Using this in (13) we get
rei + rej <
2 + 2α1
1 + 2α1 + α2
× rhM (ei) (14)
Using Lemma 5, we can partition edges of M∗ into two sets as follows: Let B denote the set
of edges ei ∈ M
∗ such that hM (ei) = hM (ej) for some ej ∈ M
∗ and let A denote the remaining
edges in M∗. We can further partition set B into two sets P and Q as follows: choose a pair ei
and ej in B such that hM (ei) = hM (ej). Denote ej by µ(ei). Put ei in P and µ(ei) in Q. Notice
that value of the matching M that Best-Relaxed-Blocking-Pair gives as output is at least∑
e∈A rhM (e) +
∑
e∈P rhM (e). (The possible additional edges in M are produced because of swivels
which match two previously unmatched nodes with each other.)
We are now in position to prove the main theorem of this section:
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Theorem 4. The price of stability in stable matching games with friendship utilities is at most
2+2α1
1+2α1+α2
, and this bound is tight.
Proof. The value of M∗ is given by
w(M∗) =
∑
e∈A
re +
∑
e∈P
re +
∑
e∈Q
re
=
∑
e∈A
re +
∑
e∈P
(re + rµ(e))
Using Lemma 5, for e ∈ P we have re + rµ(e) <
2+2α1
1+2α1+α2
× rhM (e). Using Lemma 4, for e ∈ A we
have re ≤ rhM (e). Thus we get
w(M∗) ≤
∑
e∈A
rhM (e) +
∑
e∈P
2 + 2α1
1 + 2α1 + α2
× rhM (e)
≤
2 + 2α1
1 + 2α1 + α2
(∑
e∈A
rhM (e) +
∑
e∈P
rhM (e)
)
Note that this inequality may not be strict since A may be empty. This could happen if each edge
in M∗ gets removed because of a relaxed biswivel as the algorithm proceeds (though it may be
possible that it is inserted later). We also have w(M) ≥
∑
e∈A rhM (e) +
∑
e∈P rhM (e) for the final
matching M that the algorithm gives. Using this,
w(M∗) ≤
2 + 2α1
1 + 2α1 + α2
w(M),
which proves the bound on the price of stability, since M is a stable matching.
To prove the tightness of the bound, let us make α2 = 0 and assign ruv =
1+2α1+ǫ
1+α1
, ruw = rvz = 1
in Fig 1. Then we have {(uv)} as the only stable matching but the social optimum is {(uw), (vz)}.
Thus we get PoS= 2+2α11+2α1+ǫ which can be taken arbitrarily close to
2+2α1
1+2α1
. This gives us a tight
bound given that we are using α2 = 0.
From Theorems 3 and 4, we immediately get the following corollary about the behavior of best
blocking pair dynamics. This corollary applies in particular to the model of altruism when αi = α
for all i = 1, . . . , diam(G).
Corollary 1. If α1 = α2 and we start from the centrally optimum matching, Best-Blocking-
Pair converges in O(m2) time to a stable matching that is at most a factor of 2+2α11+2α1+α2 worse than
the optimum.
Proof. Immediate since when α1 = α2, the conditions for a blocking pair are identical to the con-
ditions for a relaxed blocking pair. Hence, Best-Relaxed-Blocking-Pair is Best-Blocking-
Pair.
3 General Reward Sharing without Friendship
In the previous section we considered the case where if (uv) ∈M then u and v get the same reward
from edge (uv), namely ruv. Now we will look into the case where u and v may possibly share
the edge reward ruv if (uv) ∈ M . Let us define r
x
xy as the reward node x gets from edge (xy) if
(xy) ∈ M . We assume rxy = r
x
xy + r
y
xy as x and y share the edge reward rxy. Note that while
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in Section 2 we had both nodes u and v getting reward of ruv from edge (uv), this is actually
equivalent to u and v sharing the edge reward equally. To see this we can redefine the reward u
and v get from edge (uv) as ruv2 if (uv) ∈M . This scaling of edge reward does not affect any of the
results.
For general (unequal) reward sharing, we will give results about existence of a stable matching,
as well as bounds on prices of anarchy and stability. In addition to that, we will also focus on the
following specific reward sharing rules:
• Matthew Effect sharing: In sociology, “Matthew Effect” is a term coined by Robert Merton to
describe the phenomenon which says that, when doing similar work, the more famous person
tends to get more credit than other less-known collaborators. We model such phenomena for
our network by associating brand values λu with each node u, and defining the reward that
node u gets by getting matched with node v as ruuv =
λu
λu+λv
· ruv. Thus nodes u and v split
the edge reward in the ratio of λu : λv, and a node with high λu value gets a disproportionate
amount of reward.
• Parasite sharing: This effect is opposite to the Matthew effect in the sense that by collabo-
rating with a renowned person, a less-known person becomes famous, whereas the reputation
of the already renowned person does not change significantly from such a collaboration. We
model this situation by defining the reward that node u gets by getting matched with node
v as ruuv =
λv
λu+λv
ruv. Thus nodes u and v split the edge reward in the ratio of λv : λu, in the
exactly opposite way to the Matthew Effect sharing.
• Trust sharing: Often people collaborate based on not only the quality of a project but also
how much they trust each other. We model such a situation by associating a value βu with
each node u, which represents the trust value of player u, or how pleasant they are to work
with. Each edge (u, v) also has an inherent quality huv . Then, the reward obtained by node
u from partnering with node v is ruuv = huv + βv.
For the sake of analysis, Matthew Effect sharing and Parasite sharing are the same if we change
λu of Parasite sharing to 1/λu of Matthew Effect sharing. We will refer to both the models
as Matthew Effect sharing from now on. In the next few sections, we will give results about the
existence of stable matchings, and give upper bounds on prices of anarchy and stability for Matthew
Effect sharing and Trust sharing, as well as for general reward sharing. Note that this analysis is
for the case when friendship is absent; we consider the more general case of unequal sharing with
friendship utilities in Section 4.
3.1 Existence of a Stable Matching
Without friendship utilities, our stable matching game reduces to the stable roommate problem,
since reward shares can be arbitrary and thus induce arbitrary preference lists for each node. It is
well known that a stable matching may not exist in a stable roommate problem [16]. However, we
will prove in this section that for Matthew Effect sharing and Trust sharing, a stable matching can
always be found.
Let us define a preference cycle as a cycle (u1, u2, · · · , uk) in the graph G such that r
ui
uiui+1
≥
ruiuiui−1 with at least one inequality being strict. Chung [14] defines odd rings and proves that if a
graph does not contain odd rings, then a stable matching exists. It is straightforward to see that
absence of preference cycles implies absence of odd rings. Hence, if a graph has no preference cycles,
then a stable matching must exist. Below we prove the stronger statement that such a matching
can also be found efficiently.
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Theorem 5. A stable matching always exists in stable matching games with unequal sharing and
no preference cycles. Furthermore, a stable matching can be found in O(|V ||E|) time.
Proof. In brief, we show below that whenever there exist no preference cycles in a graph, we can
always find two nodes which prefer getting matched to each other over other nodes. We allow them
to get matched to each other and eliminate such matched nodes from the graph. Neither of these
two nodes will ever deviate from this matching. Applying the same greedy scheme on the reduced
graph will give us a stable matching. Then we will prove that this algorithm produces a stable
matching in O(|V ||E|) time. Let us now proceed to the details.
Let Tu denote the sets of “best” neighbors of u as follows:
Tu = {v ∈ N1(u) : r
u
uv ≥ r
u
uw ∀(uw) ∈ G} (15)
Now we construct a directed graph GD as follows: for all nodes u, choose a node v ∈ Tu and
draw an edge from u directed to v. Every node in this graph has one outgoing edge hence this
graph contains a (directed) cycle. If we find a cycle of length 2 then we have found two nodes
which prefer each other the most. If a (directed) cycle (u1, u2, . . . , uk) has length k > 2, then
we have ruiuiui+1 ≥ r
ui
uiui−1
. Now we cannot have ru2u2u3 > r
u2
u1u2
, otherwise in the original graph G,
(u1, u2, . . . , uk) would have constituted a preference cycle. Hence we have r
u2
u1u2
= ru2u2u3 . Thus u1
and u3 both are u2’s most preferred nodes. But we also have u1 prefer u2 the most as GD has an
edge from u1 to u2. Hence u1 and u2 is the pair of nodes that prefer each other the most.
Therefore we will always be able to find two nodes in G which prefer each other the most in
their preference lists. Match them to each other and they will never have incentive to deviate from
this matching. Remove these two nodes and repeat the procedure until no more nodes can be
matched. Because no nodes matched in this process will ever deviate, we have a stable matching.
It takes O(|E|) time to find each matched pair because for each edge we check if two nodes
prefer each other the most. Since total number of nodes to be matched are O(|V |), we find a stable
matching in O(|V ||E|) time.
Now we can prove the following theorem:
Theorem 6. No preference cycles exist with Matthew Effect sharing and Trust sharing. Hence, a
stable matching exists with Matthew Effect sharing and Trust sharing and can be found efficiently.
Proof. Suppose a preference cycle exists in Matthew Effect sharing. Then there exists a cycle
(u1, u2, . . . , uk) such that
λui
λui + λui+1
ruiui+1 ≥
λui
λui + λui−1
ruiui−1 (16)
with at least one inequality being strict. Multiplying all these inequalities and canceling common
factors, we reach a contradiction that 1 > 1. Thus a preference cycle cannot exist in Matthew
Effect sharing.
Suppose a preference exists in Trust sharing. Then there exists a cycle (u1, u2, . . . , uk) such
that
huiui+1 + βui+1 ≥ huiui−1 + βui−1 (17)
with at least one inequality being strict. Adding all these inequalities and canceling common factors,
we reach a contradiction that 0 > 0. Thus a preference cycle cannot exists in Trust sharing.
Since preference cycles cannot exist, we only need to apply Theorem 5 to obtain the desired
result.
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3.2 Prices of Anarchy and Stability with General Reward Sharing
In this section, we will investigate prices of anarchy and stability with general reward sharing.
First we will prove that for general reward sharing, the price of anarchy is upper bounded by
1 + max(uv)∈E(G)
ruuv
rvuv
. This implies a bound of 1 + max(uv)∈E(G)
λu
λv
for Matthew Effect sharing.
We will further prove that for the special case of Trust sharing, the upper bound on the price of
anarchy is 3.
Let us define R as
R = max
(uv)∈G
ruuv
rvuv
(18)
Note that we will always have R ≥ 1. We have the following theorem:
Theorem 7. If a stable matching exists, both prices of anarchy and stability in stable matching
games with unequal reward sharing (without friendship utilities) are at most R + 1 and the bound
is tight.
The tightness of this bound implies that as sharing becomes more unfair, i.e., as R → ∞,
we can find instances where both prices are unbounded. Thus unequal sharing can make things
much worse for the stable matching game. In Section 4, however, we will see that this bound will
significantly improve if we introduce friendship utilities. Thus, caring about others when reward
sharing is unfair makes a significant difference to the price of anarchy, much more so that in equal
sharing.
Now let us proceed to the proof of Theorem 7.
Proof. This theorem is simply a special case of our much more general Theorem 10, which proves
a price of anarchy bound of 1 + R+α11+α1R . Without friendship utilities, the price of anarchy bound in
Theorem 10 reduces to 1 + R1 = 1+R, as desired. To show that this bound is tight, we will use an
instance of Matthew Effect sharing. We assign the following values in Fig. 1: ruv = 2, ruw = R+1,
rvz = R + 1. Let λu = 1, λv = 1, λw = R, λz = R. Thus we have r
u
uv = r
u
uw = r
v
uv = r
v
vz = 1.
Now the matching {(uv)} is stable and hence we get PoA = R + 1. For tightness of PoS bound,
change ruv to 2 + 2ǫ. Now we have r
u
uv = r
v
uv = 1 + ǫ but r
u
uw = r
v
vz = 1, hence the matching
{(uv)} is the only stable matching. Thus we get PoS = R+11+ǫ which can be taken arbitrarily close
to R+ 1.
Theorem 8. The price of anarchy in stable matching games with Trust sharing is at most 3.
Proof. A stable matching always exists for Trust sharing by Theorem 6. Now we will prove that
the price of anarchy can be at most 3.
Let M∗ denote a socially optimum matching and let M denote a stable matching. Let w∗u
denote the reward a node u gets in M∗ and wu denote the reward a node u gets in M . Consider
an edge (uv) ∈ M∗ \M . As (u, v) is not a blocking pair in M , without loss of generality, we can
assume that the utility of u does not increase by getting matched with v in M . Now u must be
matched to some other node, say z. Call u a witness node for (uv) ∈ M∗ \M . Since u does not
want to switch to (uv) from M , then
huv + βv ≤ huz + βz (19)
Adding βu to both sides
huv + βv + βu ≤ huz + βz + βu (20)
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From Inequality (19), we get huv ≤ huz + βz . Addding this to Inequality (20), we obtain
2huv + βv + βu ≤ 2huz + 2βz + βu (21)
Suppose we form such inequalities for all (uv) ∈ M∗ \M and add them. Let us investigate the
coeffcients of terms appearing on right hand side after such addition. If a term huz appears on right
hand side, then its coeffcient can be at most 4: counting one inequality for u acting as witness,
and possibly one more inequality for z acting as witness. However, the coeffcient for a term βz
appearing on right hand side can be at most 3, because 2βz comes in when u acts as witness and
βz comes in when z acts as witness. Hence adding these inequalities will give us∑
(uv)∈M∗\M
2huv + βv + βu ≤
∑
(uv)∈M\M∗
4huv + 3βv + 3βu
⇒
∑
(uv)∈M∗\M
2huv + βv + βu ≤ 3
∑
(uv)∈M\M∗
2huv + βv + βu (22)
But rxy = r
x
xy+ r
y
xy = 2hxy +βx+βy for Trust sharing. Substituting this in inequality (22), we get∑
(uv)∈M∗\M
ruv ≤ 3
∑
(uv)∈M\M∗
ruv
⇒
w(M∗)
w(M)
=
∑
(uw)∈M∗
ruw∑
(uv)∈M
ruv
≤ 3
As this is valid for any stable matching M , we have proved that for stable matching games with
trust sharing, PoA ≤ 3.
4 Stable Matching with Friendship and General Reward Sharing
In this section, we consider general stable matching games where players may have both friendship
utilities and unequal reward sharing. We show general bounds on price of anarchy, and establish
that friendship can make a much larger difference in the context of unequal sharing than in the
case of fair sharing. First, just as at the start of Section 2, we write explicit conditions for nodes
to form a blocking pair in this context, and define some helpful notation.
The necessary and sufficient conditions for nodes (u, v) to form a biswivel from nodes w and z
(See Fig. 1) in reward sharing with friendship are:
ruuv + α1r
v
uv > r
u
uw + α1(r
w
uw + r
v
vz) + αuzr
z
vz
rvuv + α1r
u
uv > r
v
vz + α1(r
z
vz + r
u
uw) + αvwr
w
uw.
Let us define qxxy = r
x
xy + α1r
y
xy. Then the conditions for biswivel such as shown in Fig. 1 are:
quuv > q
u
uw + α1r
v
vz + αuzr
z
vz (23)
qvuv > q
v
vz + α1r
u
uw + αvwr
w
uw. (24)
Similarly, the necessary and sufficient conditions for swivel (See Fig. 2) are
ruuv + α1r
v
uv > r
u
uw + α1r
w
uw
rvuv + α1r
u
uv > α1r
u
uw + αvwr
w
uw.
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Using the definition of qxxy(·, ·), the conditions for swivel become:
quuv > q
u
uw (25)
qvuv > α1r
u
uw + αvwr
w
uw (26)
We also have
qxxy
qyxy
=
rxxy + α1r
y
xy
ryxy + α1rxxy
Using the fact that p+α11+α1p is an increasing function of p and using the definition of R, we thus obtain
qxxy
qyxy
≤
R+ α1
1 + α1R
(27)
Let us define qxy = q
x
xy + q
y
xy. Thus we obtain qxy = (1 + α1)rxy.
4.1 Existence of a Stable Matching with Friendship and General Reward Shar-
ing
In Section 2.1 we showed that for the case of equal sharing with friendship utilities, a stable
matching always exists. We showed this by proving that for equal sharing, a stable matching
without friendship utilities (i.e. ~α = 0) is also a stable matching when we have friendship utilities.
However, for unequal reward sharing with friendship, the set of stable matchings for ~α = 0
is no longer a subset of the set of stable matchings when we have friendship utilities. Moreover,
existence of a stable matching for ~α = 0 no more guarantees the existence of a stable matching with
friendship utilities. We will give examples below to justify both claims. Finally we will conclude
this section by giving a sufficient condition for the existence of a stable matching for stable matching
games with unequal reward sharing and friendship utilities.
The following is an example which has non-overlapping sets of stable matchings with and without
friendship: Assign ruuw = r
w
uw = 1, r
u
uv = 10/11, r
v
uv = 100/11 with α1 = 1/2 and α2 = α3 = · · · = 0
in Fig. 2. Without friendship utilities, {(uw)} is the only stable matching as node u will always want
to get matched to node w. However, with friendship utilities we have quuv =
60
11 , q
u
uw =
3
2 , q
v
uv =
105
11 ,
qvuw =
3
2 . Thus using inequalities (25) and (26) we see that with friendship utilities, the only
stable matching is {(uv)} as the node u will always want to get matched with node v. Thus
for unequal reward sharing with friendship utilties, the set of stable matchings can be completely
nonoverlapping with the set of stable matchings for unequal reward sharing but without friendship
utilities.
Now we give an example where we have a stable matching with ~α = 0 but no stable matching
with friendship utilities. Consider the Matthew Effect sharing example as shown in Fig. 3. The
values on edges are edge rewards of those edges. The values in the brackets beside a node label is
the brand valuee (λ value) of that node. By Theorem 6, for ~α = 0 a stable matching always exists
for Matthew Effect sharing. However, let us investigate the example for values shown in Fig. 3 with
α1 = 4/5, α2 = α3 = · · · = 0. Here we have
qqqx = 90 > q
q
pq = 89.1667
qxxy = 91.7493 > q
x
qx = 90
qyyz = 92.1545 > q
y
xy = 91.8507
qzzp = 112 > q
z
yz = 111.2455
qppq = 103.4333 > q
p
zp = 102.2
18
102
113
100
119
107
q(100)
x(100)
z(1200)p(500)
y(101)
Figure 3: Existence of a stable matching without friendship does not guarantee existence of a stable
matching with friendship
Suppose there exists a stable matching for this example. In such a matching exactly one node
would stay unmatched. Say the matching {(qx), (zp)} is a candidate for stable matching. Now the
node y is unmatched. In such a situation, (x, y) will form blocking pair because we have qxxy > q
x
qx
and qyxy > α1r
x
qx (See inequalities (25) and (26) substituting α2 = 0 as we use it in this example).
Hence {(qx), (zp)} is not a stable matching. Similarly every other matching can be shown to be
not stable. Hence here we do not have a stable matching with friendship utilities, even though with
~α = 0 a stable matching exists.
Now we give a sufficient condition for the existence of a stable matching in unequal reward
sharing with friendship utilities. Let us denote by SRPq the instance of stable roommate problem
where we have exactly the same edges in the graph as our network but in SRPq the nodes will
prepare their preference lists based on qxxy, i.e. a node u will prefer node v as roommate over w
iff quuv > q
u
uw, breaking ties arbitrarily. Note that in an instance of stable roommate problem like
SRPq friendship utilities plays no role.
Theorem 9. A stable matching for SRPq is a stable matching for matching games with unequal
reward sharing and friendship utilities. Hence, existence of a stable matching for SRPq implies the
existence of a stable matching for general reward sharing with friendship utilities.
Proof. Suppose a stable matching M for SRPq is not a stable matching for unequal reward sharing
with friendship utilities. Then there exists a blocking pair (u, v) with one of the following two
possibilities:
• In M , both u and v are matched: Let u and v be matched with w and z respectively. In such
case, for (u, v) to be a blocking pair the inequalities (23) and (24) must hold true. These
inequalities imply quuv > q
u
uw and q
v
uv > q
v
vz. But then (u, v) would be a blocking pair in SRPq.
Hence M could not have been stable in SRPq.
• InM , only one of the nodes u and v is matched: Say u is matched with w but v is unmatched.
(Both cannot be unmatched otherwise M would not be stable in SRPq). Then for (u, v) to
be a blocking pair inequalities (25) and (26) must hold true. But these inequalities imply
quuv > q
u
uw and thus (u, v) would be a blocking pair in SRPq. Hence M could not have been
stable in SRPq.
Either way we reach a contradiction. Hence M must be stable with unequal reward sharing and
friendship utilities. Moreover, the set of stable matchings in SRPq is a subset of the set of stable
matchings in unequal reward sharing with friendship utilities.
19
4.2 Price of Anarchy with Friendship and General Reward Sharing
This section is about proving the following theorem:
Theorem 10. If a stable matching exists for general reward sharing with friendship utilities, then
price of anarchy is at most 1 +Q, where Q = max(uv)∈E(G)
quuv
qvuv
= R+α11+α1R , and this bound is tight.
Proof. Let M∗ be a socially optimum matching, i.e., a matching with maximum
∑
(uv)∈M∗ ruv. Let
M be any stable matching. We will use w∗u (or wu) to denote q
u
uv if u is matched to v in M
∗ (or in
M). Because qxy = (1 + α1)rxy, we have
PoA = max
M is stable
∑
(uv)∈M∗ quv∑
(uv)∈M quv
(28)
Using the definitions of w∗u and wu and letting w
∗
u = 0 (or wu = 0) in case u is unmatched in M
∗
(or M), we get
PoA = max
M is stable
∑
u∈Gw
∗
u∑
u∈Gwu
(29)
If edge (uv) ∈M∗ \M , then the utility of at least one node among u and v does not increase if they
were to deviate in M to get matched with each other. Say the utility of node u does not increase.
Now we have three cases:
• Both u and v are matched in M : Say u and v are matched to w and z respectively. In such
a case if getting matched to v does not increase the utility of u then we have
quuv ≤ q
u
uw + α1r
v
vz + αuzr
z
vz (30)
• u is matched but v is unmatched in M : Say u is matched to w. In such a case if getting
matched to v does not increase the utility of u then we have
quuv ≤ q
u
uw (31)
• u is unmatched but v is matched in M : Say v is matched to z. In such a case if getting
matched to v does not increase the utility of u then we have
quuv ≤ α1r
v
vz + αuzr
z
vz (32)
Noticing that α1r
v
vz + αuzr
z
vz ≤ r
v
vz + α1r
z
vz = q
v
vz, each of the inequalities (30), (31), and (32)
imply that:
quuv ≤ q
u
uw + q
v
vz
A little algebraic manipulation gives us:
quuw + q
v
vz ≥ q
u
uv =
(
1
1 + q
v
uv
quuv
)
· quv
⇒ wu + wv ≥
1
1 +Q
· (w∗u + w
∗
v) (33)
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Adding such inequalities for all (uv) ∈M∗ \M , we obtain
∑
(uv)∈M∗\M
(wu + wv) ≥
1
1 +Q
·
∑
(uv)∈M∗\M
(w∗u + w
∗
v) (34)
Notice that if a node u appears in the above inequality then u is matched to different nodes in M∗
and M . Denote the set of all such nodes by B. Hence inequality (34) becomes
∑
u∈B
wu ≥
1
1 +Q
·
∑
u∈B
w∗u, (35)
and so the price of anarchy is at most 1 +Q, as desired.
Tightness of the bound: Consider the 3-length path as shown in Fig. 1. Make α2 = α3 = · · · = 0.
Substitute the following values:
ruuv =
1
1 + α1
rvuv =
1
1 + α1
ruuw =
1
1 + α1R
rwuw =
R
1 + α1R
rvvz =
1
1 + α1R
rzvz =
R
1 + α1R
Note that as desired, max(xy)∈E(G)
rxxy
r
y
xy
= R. Using qxxy = r
x
xy + αr
y
xy, we obtain
quuv = 1 q
v
uv = 1
quuw = 1 q
w
uw = Q
qvvz = 1 q
z
vz = Q
Note that as desired, max(xy)∈E(G)
qxxy
q
y
xy
= R+α11+α1R = Q. We have {(uv)} as a stable matching because
given this matching, (u,w) is not a blocking pair as we have quuw ≤ q
u
uv. Similarly (v, z) too is not
a blocking pair in matching {(uv)}. Another stable matching is {(uw), (vz)} because given this
matching, (u, v) will not be a blocking pair as we have quuv < q
u
uw + α1r
v
vz, hence the condition in
inequality (23) is violated. Since there are no other stable matchings for this graph, the price of
anarchy will be determined by the value of the worst stable matching which is {(uv)}. It is given
by
PoA =
ruw + rvz
ruv
=
quw + qvz
quv
= 1 +Q
Hence the bound is tight.
Discussion We have PoA ≤ 1 + Q where Q = R+α11+α1R . Let us consider the implications of this
bound. If α1 = 0, we have PoA ≤ 1+R which agrees with Theorem 7. If R = 1, we have PoA = 2.
This result implies Theorem 2, since when we have R = 1, then both u and v, if they are matched
to each other, get the same reward from (uv).
Notice also that R+α11+α1R is a decreasing function of α1. As α1 goes from 0 to 1, the bound goes
from 1+R to 2. Without friendship utilities, we have a tight bound PoA ≤ 1+R. Thus for ~α = 0,
it can be extremely bad if R is large. As α1 gets close to 1, however, no matter how large R is,
PoA comes down to 2 from R+1. For example, if α1 = 1/2, then it is only 3. Thus, social context
can drastically improve the outcome for the society, especially in the case of unfair and unequal
reward sharing.
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4.3 Price of Stability with Friendship and General Reward Sharing
In this section, we give a simple lower bound Q′ on the price of stability for stable matching games
with friendship and reward sharing. Furthermore, we show that this bound is within an additive
factor of 1 of optimum, i.e., Q < Q′ ≤ PoS ≤ 1 +Q.
To prove the lower bound, consider the 3-length path as shown in Fig. 1. Make α2 = α3 = · · · = 0
and and use the following values:
ruuv =
1
1 + α1
(
1 + α1(R+ 1)
(1 + α1R)
+ ǫ
)
rvuv =
1
1 + α1
(
1 + α1(R+ 1)
(1 + α1R)
+ ǫ
)
ruuw =
1
1 + α1R
rwuw =
R
1 + α1R
rvvz =
1
1 + α1R
rzvz =
R
1 + α1R
As desired we have max(xy)∈E(G)
rxxy
r
y
xy
= R. Using qxxy = r
x
xy + α1r
y
xy, we obtain
quuv =
1 + α1(R+ 1)
1 + α1R
qvuv =
1 + α1(R + 1)
1 + α1R
quuw = 1 q
w
uw =
R+ α1
1 + α1R
qvvz = 1 q
z
vz =
R+ α1
1 + α1R
As desired, we have max(xy)∈E(G)
qxxy
q
y
xy
= R+α11+α1R = Q. We have {(uv)} as a stable matching because
(u,w) is not a blocking pair as quuw ≤ q
u
uv. Similarly (v, z) will not be a blocking pair. But
the matching {(uw), (vz)} is no longer stable because (u, v) is a blocking pair as inequalities (23)
and (24) are satisfied. However {(uw), (vz)} is still the socially optimal matching. Hence the price
of stability for this graph will be given by
PoS =
ruw + rvz
ruv
=
quw + qvz
quv
=
(1 + α1)(1 +R)
1 + α1(R+ 1)
Let us define Q′ = (1+α1)(1+R)1+α1(R+1) . Because in the above instance we have PoS = Q
′, the lower bound
on the price of stability can be expressed as PoS ≥ Q′, where Q ≤ Q′ ≤ Q+ 1. Since Q+ 1 is an
upper bound on the price of stability, this means that the lower bound of Q′ is within an additive
term of 1 of optimum.
Theorem 11. The worst-case price of stability of stable matching games with friendship and general
reward sharing is in [Q′, Q+ 1], with Q < Q′ ≤ Q+ 1.
Proof. The only part that is yet to be proven is Q ≤ Q′ and Q′ ≤ 1 +Q. We have
Q′ −Q =
(1− α1 + α1R)(1 + α1)
(1 + α1 + α1R)(1 + α1R)
As (1 − α1 + α1R) ≤ (1 + α1 + α1R) and 1 + α1 ≤ 1 + α1R, we have that Q
′ −Q ≤ 1. As R ≥ 1,
the numerator is always positive. Hence 0 < Q′ −Q ≤ 1. Using this with Q′ ≤ PoS, we have that
Q < Q′ ≤ PoS ≤ 1 +Q.
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5 Convex Contribution Games (CCGs)
In this section we consider convex contribution games (CCGs), as defined in Section 1.1. In this
version of CCG, players do not have to spend all their budget: the total contribution of a player
to its incident edges must be at most Bv. This corresponds to the fact that players may decide to
keep some budget for themselves, instead of spending it all on friendships/projects that the links
represent. We consider the case when players must spend their entire budget in Section 6.
For each CCG we define a corresponding stable matching game denoted SM(G, ~α) as follows.
The edge rewards in stable matching are rewards when both players invest their full budget on
an edge in the CCG. For equal sharing this means ruv = fuv(Bu, Bv), for unequal sharing r
u
uv =
fuuv(Bu, Bv). For games with friendship we assume the same values for 0 ≤ α1 ≤ . . . ≤ αdiam(G) ≤ 1
in both games. For simplicity, we use the following notation: guuv(x, y) = f
u
uv(x, y) + α1f
v
uv(x, y)
and guv(x, y) = f
u
uv(x, y) + f
v
uv(x, y) for all x, y ≥ 0.
In general, we will show that properties like existence and total reward of pairwise equilibria in
CCGs can be derived from the properties of stable matchings in the corresponding games.
5.1 Existence of a Pairwise Equilibrium
We start by showing a general reduction for existence of a pairwise equilibrium for arbitrary ~α.
Recall that all reward functions of CCG are assumed to be convex in both its parameters, and
satisfy the property that f(x, 0) = f(y, 0) = 0 for all x, y. We call the class of such functions C0.
Theorem 12. If all reward functions fuuv(·, ·) ∈ C0, then for every stable matching of the corre-
sponding SM(G, ~α) there is an equivalent pairwise equilibrium in the CCG. The pairwise equilibrium
has the same assignment structure and total reward.
Proof. Let M be a stable matching in SM(G, ~α) and consider the following strategy profile for the
CCG: if node u is matched to node v in M , set su(uv) = Bu. If u is not matched in M , then
set su(uv) = 0 for all incident edges (uv) ∈ E. We will show that s is a pairwise equilibrium.
Obviously, s has the same structure as M and, in particular, yields the same total reward.
First, note that fuuv(x, y) is increasing and convex in both arguments, which implies the same
for guuv(x, y). Second, note that in s for each edge we have both players contributing the full budget
or nothing. Thus, players can deviate unilaterally or bilaterally only by reallocating budget onto
edges (uv) 6∈M .
Suppose two players u and v deviate and do not move any additional effort to their common
edge (uv) (because, e.g., (uv) 6∈ E, or (uv) ∈ M and both already spend all budget there). They
cannot increase reward on incident edges inM (if any), because they are spending their full budget.
For every other incident edge e 6∈M , e 6= (uv) they cannot increase the reward beyond 0, because
the other player keeps putting 0 effort. Hence, the only possibility to strictly improve their reward
is when both players move some non-zero effort to (uv). This, in particular, shows that there are
no improving unilateral deviations.
Hence, let us focus on bilateral deviations of players u and v by moving some effort to a common
edge. If both players are unmatched in M and have such a improving deviation, this contradicts
that M is a stable matching. Hence, the following two cases remain.
• Suppose there exists a improving bilateral deviation onto (uv) 6∈ M and exactly one player,
say v, is unmatched in M . Let u be matched to w in M . We assume that in the CCG u and
v can improve by moving ǫ1 and ǫ2 of budget to (uv), respectively. This implies
guuw(Bu, Bw) < g
u
uv(ǫ1, ǫ2) + g
u
uw(Bu − ǫ1, Bw)
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As both guuv and g
u
uw are convex in both arguments, this means that
guuw(Bu, Bw) < g
u
uv(Bu, ǫ2) < g
u
uv(Bu, Bv) .
For SM(G, ~α) this shows guuv > g
u
uw, but then v cannot be unmatched, because this would
contradict that M is a stable matching.
• Suppose there exists a proftiable bilateral deviation onto an edge (uv) 6∈ M , where u is
matched to w and v to z in M . If u and v transfer ǫ1 and ǫ2 to (uv), respectively, then for
node u we have
guuv(ǫ1, ǫ2) > g
u
uw(Bu, Bw)− g
u
uw(Bu − ǫ1, Bw)
+α1(f
v
vz(Bv, Bz)− f
v
vz(Bv − ǫ2, Bz))
+αuz(f
z
vz(Bv, Bz)− f
z
vz(Bv − ǫ2, Bz)) , (36)
which formally states that there is a net increase in the utility of u because of the transfer.
Similarly for node v we have
gvuv(ǫ1, ǫ2) > g
v
vz(Bv, Bz)− g
v
vz(Bv − ǫ2, Bz)
+α1(f
u
uw(Bu, Bw)− f
u
uw(Bu − ǫ1, Bw))
+αvw(f
w
uw(Bu, Bw)− f
w
uw(Bu − ǫ1, Bw)) . (37)
As all functions f and g are convex and increasing in both arguments, we get
guuv(Bu, Bv) > g
u
uw(Bu, Bw) + α1f
v
vz(Bv, Bz) + αuzf
z
vz(Bv , Bz)
gvuv(Bu, Bv) > g
v
vz(Bv, Bz) + α1f
u
uw(Bu, Bw) + αvwf
w
uw(Bu, Bw) ,
but then in SM(G, ~α) the following must hold true
quuv > q
u
uw + α1r
v
vz + αuzr
z
vz
qvuv > q
v
vz + α1r
u
uw + αvwr
w
uw .
This means that in SM(G, ~α), nodes u and v would prefer getting matched to each other (see
inequalities (23) and (24))), i.e., M is not a stable matching in SM(G, ~α) which contradicts
our assumption.
The conditions for existence of a pairwise equilibrium can be weakened for CCGs without
friendship. In this case, convexity of reward share in the other player’s contribution is not necessary.
Corollary 2. If fuuv(su(uv), sv(uv)) are increasing in su(uv) and sv(uv) and convex in su(uv), then
for every stable matching of the corresponding game SM(G, ~α = 0), there is an equivalent pairwise
equilibrium in the CCG without friendship. The pairwise equilibrium has the same assignment
structure and total reward.
Proof. We just need to observe that fuuv(su(uv), sv(uv)) does not need to be convex in sv(uv). In
the proof of the previous theorem, convexity in sv(uv) is only required in inequality (36) and (37)
with the α2 coefficient.
We proceed to specify more detailed results for particular reward sharing rules.
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Equal Sharing We first consider equal sharing with (or without) friendship. In this case,
SM(G, ~α) always has a stable matching from Theorem 1. Also, because fuv(su(uv), sv(uv)) =
fuuv(su(uv), sv(uv)) = f
v
uv(su(uv), sv(uv)) and fuv(·, ·) ∈ C0, we also have f
u
uv(·, ·) ∈ C0 and
fuuv(·, ·) ∈ C0. Hence all the conditions for existence of a pairwise equilibrium are satisfied. The
following corollary extends a main result from [5] to CCGs with arbitrary friendship.
Corollary 3. A pairwise equilibrium always exists in a CCG with equal sharing.
Matthew Effect Sharing Next, let us consider Matthew Effect CCGs defined as follows: Each
node u ∈ G has an associated brand value λu. If nodes u and v invest su(uv) and sv(uv) respectively
on edge (uv), then u obtains a reward of
fuuv(su(uv), sv(uv)) =
λu
λu + λv
fuv(su(uv), sv(uv))
from edge (uv). Consequently in Matthew Effect CCG, we have
guuv(su(uv), sv(uv)) =
λu + α1λv
λu + λv
fuv(su(uv), sv(uv)) .
It can be easily seen that in Matthew Effect CCG, fuuv(·, ·) are increasing and convex in the
investment of u and v. Hence we have the following corollaries from Theorem 12 and Lemma 6.
Corollary 4. For every stable matching of the corresponding game SM(G, ~α) with Matthew Effect
Sharing, there is an equivalent pairwise equilibrium in the Matthew Effect CCG. The pairwise
equilibrium has the same assignment structure and total reward.
As a special case, we have guaranteed existence for Matthew Effect CCGs without friendship.
Corollary 5. A pairwise equilibrium always exists in Matthew Effect CCGs without friendship.
Proportional Sharing Finally, let us consider a natural model of sharing that is specific to
CCGs (this model was not considered in Section 3). In Proportional Sharing CCG, the reward a
node gets is proportional to the effort it contributes to an edge. In other words, if nodes u and v
invest su(uv) and sv(uv) respectively on edge (uv), then u gets a reward of
fuuv(su(uv), sv(uv)) =
su(uv)
su(uv) + sv(uv)
fuv(su(uv), sv(uv))
from edge (uv). Consequently, in Proportional Sharing CCG, we have
guuv(su(uv), sv(uv)) =
su(uv) + α1sv(uv)
su(uv) + sv(uv)
fuv(su(uv), sv(uv)) .
For a proportional sharing CCGs, it can be verified that fuuv(su(uv), sv(uv)) are increasing
in su(uv) and sv(uv) and convex in su(uv). It is easy to observe that the corresponding stable
matching game is, in fact, an instance of the Matthew Effect model with λu = Bu for all nodes
u ∈ G. Hence, without friendship a stable matching always exists in the stable matching game and
provides the following corollary based on Corollary 2:
Corollary 6. For every stable matching of the corresponding game SM(G, ~α = 0) with Matthew
Effect Sharing, there is an equivalent pairwise equilibrium in the Proportional Sharing CCG without
friendship. The pairwise equilibrium has the same assignment structure and total reward. There
always exists at least one such stable matching with corresponding pairwise equilibrium.
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5.2 Prices of Anarchy and Stability
In the previous section, we have seen that stable matchings can easily be translated into pairwise
equilibria for CCGs. However, there could potentially be other pairwise equilibria that are, in
particular, much worse in terms of total reward. In this section, we show that this is not the case
and translate the bounds for prices of anarchy and stability from stable matching to CCGs. Thus,
these bounds apply for all reward functions fuuv(·, ·) ∈ C0.
Let us define a tight edge as an edge on which both of the nodes invest their full budget. The
social optimum with maximum total reward does not depend on the reward sharing scheme at
hand or on the values of ~α. Thus, Claim 2.10 in [5] shows that there always exists a tight social
optimum, i.e., a social optimum s∗ such that players invest only in tight edges. In particular, as the
CCG allows more flexibility than the corresponding stable matching game SM(G, ~α), a tight social
optimum in the CCG is in 1-to-1 correspondence to a social optimum in SM(G, ~α). Whenever
stable matchings in SM(G, ~α) correspond to pairwise equilibria in the CCG and a tight social
optimum in the CCG corresponds to a social optimum in the corresponding SM(G, ~α), we can
directly translate our upper bounds on the price of stability to CCGs. This implies the following
corollary.
Corollary 7. The price of stability in CCGs with equal sharing and friendship is at most 2+2α11+2α1+α2 .
Best-Relaxed-Blocking-Pair starting from a tight social optimum converges in polynomial time
to a pairwise equilibrium that achieves this bound.
For the price of anarchy, we could possibly have worse equilibria in the CCG that do not corre-
spond to matchings in SM(G, ~α). However, the same bound as in Theorem 10 can be proved. We
use parameter Q (as detailed in Section 4) for the corresponding stable matching game SM(G, ~α).
Theorem 13. The price of anarchy in CCGs is bounded by PoA ≤ Q+ 1.
Proof. It suffices to compare against a tight social optimum which we denote by s∗. Let s denote
a pairwise equilibrium. Let su(uv) denote the investment of node u on edge (uv) in the pairwise
equilibrium s. Let us define wu as:
wu =
∑
z∈N1(u)
guuz(su(uz), sz(uz)) (38)
Using the definition of wu, it can be verified that the total reward w(s) of s is given by
w(s) =
1
1 + α1
∑
u∈G
wu (39)
and the total reward w(s∗) of s∗ is
w(s∗) =
1
1 + α1
∑
(uv)∈s∗
guv(Bu, Bv) (40)
where by (uv) ∈ s∗ we mean the tight edges in s∗. Hence the price of anarchy can also be expressed
as
PoA = max
s
w(s∗)
w(s)
= max
s
∑
(uv)∈s∗ guv(Bu, Bv)∑
u∈Gwu
(41)
We will use this alternative expression for the price of anarchy for proving the claim.
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Let us construct a set of witness nodes in one-to-one correspondence with tight edges in s∗ as
follows: For each tight edge (uv) of s we make either u or v a witness for (uv). On other edges,
we have either su(uv) < Bu or sv(uv) < Bv. Now as s is a pairwise equilibrium, if u and v both
transfer their full budget to (uv), utility of at least one – we w.l.o.g. assume node u – will not
increase, and we make u witness for (uv).
As the deviation towards (uv) is not improving, we can examine the utility u and bound
guuv(Bu, Bv) ≤
∑
y∈N1(u)
guuy(su(uy), sy(uy)) + α1
∑
z∈N1(v)−u
f vvz(sv(v), sz(vz))
+
∑
z∈N1(v)−u
αuzf
z
vz(sv(vz), sz(vz))
As a consequence of α1f
v
vz(sv(vz), sz(vz)) + αuzf
z
vz(sv(vz), sz(vz)) ≤ α1f
v
vz(sv(vz), sz(vz)) +
α1f
z
vz(sv(vz), sz(vz)) ≤ f
v
vz(sv(vz), sz(vz)) + α1f
z
vz(sv(vz), sz(vz)) = g
v
vz(sv(vz), sz(vz)), we obtain
guuv(Bu, Bv) ≤
∑
y∈N1(u)
guuy(su(uy), sy(uy)) +
∑
z∈N1(v)−u
gvvz(sv(vz), sz(vz)) (42)
⇒
1
1 +Q
· guv(Bu, Bv) ≤
∑
y∈N1(u)
guuy(su(uy), sy(uy)) +
∑
z∈N1(v)
gvvz(sv(vz), sz(vz)) (43)
⇒
1
1 +Q
· guv(Bu, Bv) ≤ wu + wv (44)
Note that the last inequality (44) also holds for tight edges (uv). Thus we have one inequality
due to witnessing each edge. Adding these inequalities,
1
1 +Q
∑
(uv)∈s∗
guv(Bu, Bv) ≤
∑
(uv)∈s∗
(wu + wv) ≤
∑
u∈G
wu
Hence we get ∑
(uv)∈s∗ guv(Bu, Bv)∑
u∈Gwu
≤ 1 +Q
As this is valid for any pairwise equilibrium s, using Eqn. (41), we can complete the proof by finding
PoA ≤ 1 +Q .
6 Contribution Games With Tight Budget Constraints
In this section we consider the version of contribution games where all player budget must be spent
on adjacent edges, i.e., the sum of each player v’s contributions to incident edges
∑
(v,u) sv(vu)
exactly equals Bv. At first glance, this version of the game does not seem very different than the
case when
∑
(v,u) sv(vu) ≤ Bv. And in fact, when node utilities simply consist of Ru(s) (i.e., there
is no “friendship” component), then it can be easily shown that all the results from [5] and from
Section 5 still hold.
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The presence of friendship utilities, however, makes a large difference. Consider, for instance,
the simple example in Fig. 1 with reward functions fuw(x, y) = fvz(x, y) = (1 − ε)min(x, y),
fuv(x, y) = min(x, y), all node budgets equal to 1, and α1 = 1/2, α2 = α3 = 0. If nodes were
allowed to contribute less than their budget, then the solution where the two middle nodes put all
their budget on the edge between them, and the two endpoints do not contribute anything, is a
pairwise equilibrium. If, however, the two endpoint nodes must contribute their budget to their
incident edges, then this is no longer a pairwise equilibrium, as the two middle nodes are able to
simultaneously move their budgets to the outer edges, obtaining (1+ 2α1)(1− ε) > (1+α1) utility
each. In general, the argument for existence of pairwise equilibrium from Section 5 no longer works,
as stable matchings may no longer correspond to pairwise equilibrium as they did in Theorem 12.
Moreover, the existence argument from [5] is based on forming a maximal greedy matching, which,
as the above example shows, is not necessarily a pairwise equilibrium.
Fortunately, we are able to extend many of our results to the version where players must spend
their entire budgets as well. Specifically, we show that all our results still hold for the case of equal
sharing, with αi = 0 for all i ≥ 2. We call this type of perceived utility local friendship, since nodes
only care about their neighbors, but not their neighbors-of-neighbors. In the rest of this section,
we let α = α1, since it is the only non-zero αi.
As the example above shows, even for the case of local friendship, contribution games with tight
budget constraints can behave peculiarly. Essentially, the complication here arises from the fact
that a stable matching is stable with respect to swivel and biswivel deviations only. On the other
hand, a pairwise equilibrium has to be stable with respect to all bilateral deviations, including
two non-adjacent nodes switching contributions, or two adjacent nodes moving their contributions
away from their shared edge. If all unmatched nodes do not contribute anything to incident edges,
then all these deviations cannot be improving (see Theorem 12), but in the model where all budget
must be spent, these deviations can and do occur.
The key to our results in this section is the following theorem. To state the theorem, we
first need the concept of forbidden edges, defined below. As in Section 5, SM(G, ~α) is the stable
matching game corresponding to a CCG, and ruv = fuv(Bu, Bv) as before.
Definition 4. We call an edge e = (u, v) in a contribution game forbidden if both of the following
hold:
1. There exist edges (u, x) and (v, y) with x 6= v, y 6= u, and both x, y having degree 1.
2. u and v would be willing to deviate by putting all their budget on edges (u, x) and (v, y)
even if both u and v are putting all their budget on edge e. In other words, e is such that
ruv + αruv < rux + αrux + αrvy and ruv + αruv < rvy + αrvy + αrux.
Theorem 14. Consider a CCG with equal reward sharing and local friendship in which all players
must contribute their entire budget to incident edges. Let a matching M be a stable matching in the
corresponding SM(G, ~α). IfM does not contain any forbidden edges, then there exists an equivalent
pairwise equilibrium, with the same assignment structure and total reward, obtained by having all
unmatched nodes split their contributions equally among all incident edges.
Proof. Set the strategy of a node u with an edge (u, v) ∈M to put all its budget onto edge (u, v).
If a node is unmatched in M , then we set its strategy to spread its budget equally among all its
incident edges. Call this solution s; our goal is to show that s is a pairwise equilibrium. Since all
functions fe are nondecreasing and convex in both parameters, we can restrict our attention, wlog,
to deviations where nodes move all their budget to a single edge.
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It is clear that no unilateral improving deviations exist in s. This is because if a node v could
gain utility by unilaterally moving effort to an edge e = (u, v), then u must be unmatched (recall
that fe(Bv , 0) = 0 by definition of CCG), and so v would gain by performing a swivel to u in M ,
contradicting the stability of M . Similarly, swivels and biswivels (i.e., deviations where two nodes
u and v move all their effort to the edge (u, v)) cannot be improving deviations, since otherwise M
would not be a stable matching. The above argument also implies that no unmatched node would
participate in an improving deviation from s, since it can only obtain positive reward by putting
effort on an edge to another unmatched node, which contradicts the stability of M , since all stable
matchings are maximal.
Now we must consider all other types of deviations. Specifically, we must now show that for
every pair of nodes u and v that are matched in M (not necessarily to each other), there is no
improving bilateral deviation of u and v. Let e1 = (u,w) and e2 = (v, z) be the edges of M incident
to u and v respectively. Note that e1 may equal e2.
Suppose to the contrary that u and v have an improving bilateral deviation in s, and let
e3 = (u, x) be the edge that u moves its budget to, and e4 = (v, y) be the edge that v moves
its budget to. We know that e3 6= e4, since otherwise this deviation corresponds to an improving
biswivel in M , which is not possible since M is a stable matching. This means that wlog, in a
bilateral deviation u and v will move all their budget to an edge incident to an unmatched node:
this is because by moving its budget to an edge incident to a matched node that is neither e1 or
(u, v), u will end up with 0 reward. Thus, if an improving bilateral deviation of u and v exists,
then in this deviation u and v move their budgets from e1 and e2 (which may be the same edge
e1 = (u, v) = e2) to edges e3 = (u, x) and e4 = (v, y), which are not the same edges. It is still
possible, however, that x may equal y.
Denote by γx the reward on edge e3 obtained if node u puts all its budget onto this edge,
i.e., γx = fux(Bu, sx(ux)). Note that if x has only a single incident edge, then γx = rux, since
sx(ux) = Bx in this case. If instead x has degree at least 2, then γx ≤ rux/2, since x is splitting
its budget evenly among all incident edges, and since fux is convex in the contribution of node x.
Similarly, define γy as fvy(Bv, sy(vy)). Finally, we will use notation [a]P to denote a if property P
holds, and 0 otherwise.
Case 1: e1 = e2 = (u, v) In this case, it cannot be that both x and y have degree 1, since this
would imply that (u, v) is a forbidden edge, and thus could not be in M . Therefore, we can assume
that, wlog, the degree of x is at least 2. The only rewards that change during the deviation are the
rewards on (u, v), e3, and e4. The reward u receives from edges e3 and e4 after the deviation is at
most γx + αγx + αγy + αγy; the last term is only present if node y is adjacent to u. Since x has
degree at least 2, then in order for this to be a profitable deviation for u, it must be that
rux + αrux
2
+ αrvy > ruv + αruv. (45)
Recall that nodes x and y are unmatched in M . Due to stability of M , it must be that
ruv ≥ rux and ruv ≥ rvy, since otherwise swiveling from (u, v) to (u, x) or from (u, v) to (v, y)
would be an improving swivel deviation in the stable matching. Thus, Inequality (45) implies that
(1 + α)ruv < (
1
2 +
3α
2 )ruv, which is a contradiction since α ≤ 1.
Case 2: e1 6= e2 We now have the final case to consider, in which e1 6= e2 (recall also that
e3 6= e4). The total contribution of rewards of e1 = (u,w) and e2 = (v, z) to the utilities of u and
v before the deviation was at least
(1 + α+ [α](u,v)∈E)(ruw + rvz). (46)
29
Note that the contribution can be even larger if, for example, u is adjacent to z, but it is at least
as large as (46). The total contribution of rewards of e3 and e4 to u and v after the deviation is at
most
(1 + α+ [α](u,v)∈E)(γx + γy) + [αγx]deg(x)>1 + [αγy]deg(y)>1, (47)
where deg(x) is the degree of x. Thus for this deviation to be strictly improving, it must be that
(47)) > (46)).
If deg(x) = 1, then (1 + α + [α](u,v)∈E)(γx) + [αγx]deg(x)>1 = (1 + α + [α](u,v)∈E)rux, since
in this case γx = rux. If deg(x) > 1, then (1 + α + [α](u,v)∈E)(γx) + [αγx]deg(x)>1 ≤ (1 + 2α +
[α](u,v)∈E)(rux/2), since in this case γx ≤ rux/2, as argued above. Thus in either case, (1 + α +
[α](u,v)∈E)(γx) + [αγx]deg(x)>1 ≤ (1 + α+ [α](u,v)∈E)rux, and so quantity (47) is at most
(1 + α+ [α](u,v)∈E)(rux + rvy) (48)
As argued above, since both x and y are unmatched in M , then we know that ruw ≥ rux
and rvz ≥ rvy, since otherwise M would have an improving swivel. Therefore, quantity (46) is at
least (48)), and so (47) ≤ (46). Therefore, this cannot be an improving deviation.
Using the above theorem, we can proceed similarly to Section 5, and show existence of pairwise
equilibrium, convergence results, and the same bounds for price of stability as before.
Theorem 15. Consider a CCG with equal reward sharing and local friendship utilities in which all
players must contribute their entire budget to incident edges. Then, the price of stability is at most
2+2α
1+2α , and a pairwise equilibrium that achieves this bound exists and can be found in polynomial
time.
Proof. Recall that, by the discussion at the start of Section 5.2, the optimal solution in this game
simply corresponds to the maximum-weight matching M∗. First, notice that M∗ does not contain
forbidden edges. This is easy to see, since if a forbidden edge e = (u, v) ∈ M∗, then the nodes x
and y of degree 1 adjacent to u and v must be unmatched. Removing (u, v) from M∗, and adding
(u, x) and (v, y), increases the weight of the matching. This is because, by definition of forbidden
edge,
ruv <
1 + 2α
2 + 2α
(rux + rvy),
and thus ruv < rux + rvy. Since M
∗ is the maximum weight matching, this is a contradiction, and
thus M∗ cannot contain forbidden edges. Moreover, every node adjacent to a forbidden edge must
be matched in M∗, otherwise we could add the edge between this node and a node of degree 1 to
increase the weight of M∗.
Now consider the same game, but with all forbidden edges removed from the graph. The
maximum-weight matching does not change, and thus the optimum solution does not change. Let
a matching M be the matching found by Best-Relaxed-Blocking-Pair in the corresponding
matching game SM(G, ~α) (this is the game with all forbidden edges removed). Define a solution
s to be such that all nodes matched in M put all their effort on edges of M , and all unmatched
nodes split their effort equally among all incident edges. By Theorem 4, the weight of M is at least
1+2α
2+2α of the weight of M
∗, and thus s meets the desired price of stability bound. s can clearly be
found in poly-time, since M can be found in poly-time.
To show that s is a pairwise equilibrium, we will use Theorem 14. M clearly does not contain
forbidden edges, since all of these edges were removed before forming M . It is also stable with
respect to deviations to non-forbidden edges, since Best-Relaxed-Blocking-Pair forms a stable
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matching. Thus, all we need to show is that M is stable with respect to deviations to forbidden
edges.
To show this, consider a forbidden edge (u, v), with nodes x and y defined as in the definition of
forbidden edge. In matching M , u must be matched to some node w 6= v: this is because it cannot
be matched to v (we removed edge (u, v) when running our algorithm to form the matching), and
it cannot be unmatched since nodes u and x would then form a blocking pair in M . Moreover,
ruw ≥ rux, since otherwise u would have an improving swivel to node x in matching M . The same
holds for node v: it must be matched to some node z such that rvz ≥ rvy. By definition of forbidden
edge, this implies that (u, v) does not form a blocking pair, even with edge (u, v) present.
We have now shown that M is a stable matching that does not contain forbidden edges, and
thus s is a pairwise equilibrium, as desired.
Finally, since a pairwise equilibrium when nodes spend their entire budget is also a pairwise
equilibrium for the CCG without tight budget constraints, then we obtain the following corollary
of Theorem 13.
Corollary 8. The price of anarchy in CCGs in which all players must contribute their entire budget
to incident edges is bounded by PoA ≤ 1 +Q.
References
[1] David Abraham, Ariel Levavi, David Manlove, and Gregg O’Malley.: The stable roommates
problem with globally ranked pairs. Internet Math., 5(4):493–515, 2008.
[2] Heiner Ackermann, Paul Goldberg, Vahab Mirrokni, Heiko Ro¨glin, and Berthold Vo¨cking.:
Uncoordinated two-sided matching markets. SIAM J. Comput., 40(1):92–106, 2011.
[3] Elliot Anshelevich and Sanmay Das.: Matching, cardinal utility, and social welfare. SIGecom
Exchanges, 9(1):4, 2010.
[4] Elliot Anshelevich, Sanmay Das, and Yonatan Naamad.: Anarchy, stability, and utopia:
Creating better matchings. In Proc. 2nd Intl. Symp. Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT),
pages 159–170, 2009.
[5] Elliot Anshelevich and Martin Hoefer.: Contribution games in networks. Algorithmica, Volume
63, 1-2 (2012), pp. 51–90. Conference version appeared in Proc. 18th European Symposium on
Algorithms (ESA), volume 1, pages 158–169, 2010.
[6] Esteban Arcaute and Sergei Vassilvitskii.: Social networks and stable matchings in the job
market. In Proc. 5th Intl. Workshop Internet & Network Economics (WINE), pages 220–231,
2009.
[7] Itai Ashlagi, Piotr Krysta, and Moshe Tennenholtz.: Social context games. In Proc. 4th Intl.
Workshop Internet & Network Economics (WINE), pages 675–683, 2008.
[8] John Augustine, Ning Chen, Edith Elkind, Angelo Fanelli, Nick Gravin, and Dmitry Shiryaev.
Dynamics of Profit-Sharing Games. In Proc. of IJCAI 2011.
[9] Coralio Ballester, Antoni Calvo´-Armengol, and Yves Zenou.: Who’s who in networks. Wanted:
The key player. Econometrica, 74(5):1403–1417, 2006.
31
[10] Yann Bramoulle´ and Rachel Kranton.: Public goods in networks. J. Econ. Theory, 135(1):478–
494, 2007.
[11] Russell Buehler, Zachary Goldman, David Liben-Nowell, Yuechao Pei, Jamie Quadri, Alexa
Sharp, Sam Taggart, Tom Wexler, and Kevin Woods.: The price of civil society. In Proc. 7th
Intl. Workshop Internet & Network Economics (WINE), 2011.
[12] Po-An Chen, Bart De Keijzer, David Kempe, and Guido Schaefer.: On the robust price
of anarchy of altruistic games. In Proc. 7th Intl. Workshop Internet & Network Economics
(WINE), 2011.
[13] Po-An Chen and David Kempe. Altruism, selfishness, and spite in traffic routing.: In Proc.
9th Conf. Electronic Commerce (EC), pages 140–149, 2008.
[14] Kim-Sau Chung. On the existence of stable roommate matchings.: Games Econom. Behav.,
33(2):206–230, 2000.
[15] Ilan Eshel, Larry Samuelson, and Avner Shaked.: Altruists, egoists and hooligans in a local
interaction model. Amer. Econ. Rev., 88(1):157–179, 1998.
[16] David Gale and Lloyd Shapley.: College admissions and the stability of marriage. Amer. Math.
Monthly, 69(1):9–15, 1962.
[17] Andrea Galeotti, Sanjeev Goyal, Matthew Jackson, Fernando Vega-Redondo, and Leeat Yariv.:
Network games. Rev. Econom. Studies, 77(1):218–244, 2010.
[18] Michel Goemans, Li Li, Vahab Mirrokni, and Marina Thottan.: Market sharing games applied
to content distribution in ad-hoc networks. IEEE J. Sel. Area Comm., 24(5):1020–1033, 2006.
[19] Dan Gusfield and Robert Irving.: The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms.
MIT Press, 1989.
[20] Martin Hoefer.: Local matching dynamics in social networks. In Proc. 38th Intl. Coll. Au-
tomata, Languages and Programming (ICALP), volume 2, pages 113–124, 2011.
[21] Martin Hoefer, Michal Penn, Maria Polukarov, Alexander Skopalik, and Berthold Vo¨cking.:
Considerate equilibrium. In Proc. 22nd Intl. Joint Conf. Artif. Intell. (IJCAI), pages 234–239,
2011.
[22] Martin Hoefer and Alexander Skopalik.: Altruism in atomic congestion games. In Proc. 17th
European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA), pages 179–189, 2009.
[23] Martin Hoefer and Alexander Skopalik.: Stability and convergence in selfish scheduling with
altruistic agents. In Proc. 5th Intl. Workshop Internet & Network Economics (WINE), pages
616–622, 2009.
[24] Robert Irving.: An efficient algorithm for the ”stable roommates” problem. J. Algorithms,
6(4):577–595, 1985.
[25] Matthew Jackson.: Social and Economic Networks. Princeton University Press, 2008.
[26] Yashodhan Kanoria, Mohsen Bayati, Christian Borgs, Jennifer Chayes, and Andrea Monta-
nari.: Fast convergence of natural bargaining dynamics in exchange networks. In Proc. 22nd
Symp. Discrete Algorithms (SODA), pages 1518–1537, 2011.
32
[27] Jon Kleinberg and E´va Tardos.: Balanced outcomes in social exchange networks. In Proc.
40th Symp. Theory of Computing (STOC), pages 295–304, 2008.
[28] Jon M. Kleinberg and Sigal Oren.: Mechanisms for (mis)allocating scientific credit. In Proc.
43rd Symp. Theory of Computing (STOC), pages 529–538, 2011.
[29] John Ledyard.: Public goods: A survey of experimental resesarch. In John Kagel and Alvin
Roth, editors, Handbook of Experimental Economics, pages 111–194. Princeton University
Press, 1997.
[30] David Levine.: Modeling altruism and spitefulness in experiments. Rev. Econom. Dynamics,
1:593–622, 1998.
[31] Fabien Mathieu.: Self-stabilization in preference-based systems. Peer-to-Peer Netw. Appl.,
1(2):104–121, 2008.
[32] Dominic Meier, Yvonne Anne Oswald, Stefan Schmid, and Roger Wattenhofer.: On the
windfall of friendship: Inoculation strategies on social networks. In Proc. 9th Conf. Electronic
Commerce (EC), pages 294–301, 2008.
[33] Bezalel Peleg and Peter Sudho¨lter.: Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games. Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 2003.
[34] Alvin Roth and Marilda Oliveira Sotomayor.: Two-sided Matching: A study in game-theoretic
modeling and analysis. Cambridge University Press, 1990.
[35] Alvin Roth and John H. Vande Vate.: Random paths to stability in two-sided matching.
Econometrica, 58(6):1475–1480, 1990.
[36] E´va Tardos and Tom Wexler.: Network formation games. In Noam Nisan, E´va Tardos, Tim
Roughgarden, and Vijay Vazirani, editors, Algorithmic Game Theory, chapter 19. Cambridge
University Press, 2007.
[37] Chung-Piaw Teo and Jay Sethuraman.: The geometry of fractional stable matchings and its
applications. Math. Oper. Res., 23(5):874–891, 1998.
[38] Yair Zick, Georgios Chalkiadakis, and Edith Elkind. Overlapping Coalition Formation Games:
Charting the Tractability Frontier. AAMAS 2012.
33
